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This paper studies the price impact of corporate bond illiquidity. 
Through dynamic panel estimation, price dispersion and resiliency, 
which have been used separately in extant studies, are simultaneously 
considered to price illiquidity. We find that the dynamic model, which 
has both measures, fits better than the static model that incorporates 
only price dispersion. We also confirm that the impact of the two 
measures systematically react to credit ratings of bonds. These results 
imply the importance of considering multiple measures to price 
illiquidity.
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I. Introduction
During previous financial crises and in the recent episode triggered by 
the Lehman shock, we have observed large time-series and cross-sectional 
variations in asset prices. These variations do not necessarily move well 
with each other and occasionally show rough dynamics (Figure 1). As de- 
monstrated in a number of extant studies, classical asset pricing models 
that focus on credit risk factors cannot generally explain the reality of 
asset price variations (e.g., Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001). With the presum- 
ption that the misalignment between model prediction and data occurs 
when liquidity of financial assets becomes low, the field of asset pricing 
has ― over the last decade ― focused on establishing appropriate proxies 
for liquidity factors.
Compared with extant studies that focus exclusively on a single illiqui- 
dity measure, the current paper studies the pricing impact of corporate 
bond illiquidity by simultaneously using static and dynamic measures of 
illiquidity. Among various illiquidity measures proposed in the literature, 
we consider price dispersion among multiple market makers (Houweling 
et al. 2005; Tychon and Vannetelbosch 2005; Kaguraoka 2010; Cici et al. 
2011; Ou 2011), which we call GAP, as a static measure of illiquidity. 
GAP is the difference between the highest minus the lowest values of the 
simultaneously reported corporate bond spreads among multiple market 
makers. For the dynamic measure, we use price resiliency (e.g., Kyle 1985; 
BIS 1999). A standard definition of resiliency is the rapid restoration of 
normal market prices. In this sense, low price resiliency is also quantified 
as the high persistency of prices. We study how static and dynamic 
measures affect the median spread of reported corporate bonds among 
multiple market makers by using a dynamic panel estimation framework.
In this paper, the asset price of corporate bonds is represented by 
“spread,” which denotes the yield difference between similarly mature 
corporate bonds and Japanese Government Bonds (JGB). We particularly 
focus on the difference between linearly interpolated three-year corporate 
bond yield and government bond yield. Based on the presumption that 
government bonds are risk-free and are highly liquid (especially in rela- 
tively short-term maturities), we use the difference as a measure of credit 
and illiquidity risk premium, which is the dependent variable used in our 
empirical study.1
To motivate the study of corporate bonds, we briefly recall the illiquid 
1 We will discuss the validity of this presumption later.
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Note: Bold solid lines show the three-year corporate bond spreads of two sample 
firms in our dataset. The dashed lines account for the stock prices of 
those two firms plotted on a reversed axis.
FIGURE 1(2)
CORPORATE BOND SPREADS AND INDIVIDUAL STOCK PRICES
Note: The bold solid line and bold dashed line show the three-year corporate 
bond spreads of two sample firms in our dataset. The fine dashed line 
accounts for the level of Nikkei 225 Index plotted on a reversed axis.
FIGURE 1(1)
CORPORATE BOND SPREADS AND STOCK INDEX
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nature of corporate bond markets. Given that majority of investors of cor- 
porate bonds rely on the “buy and hold” type of investment strategy, the 
transaction volume is usually limited, and market making is very inactive. 
This is different from markets with frequent trading, such as stock and 
government bond markets.2 Widely accepted liquidity proxies, such as 
bid-ask spreads, are not easily obtainable for corporate bonds. Conse- 
quently, the use of many major liquidity proxies referenced in other liquid 
markets becomes difficult.3 Here, we choose price dispersion and resiliency 
to capture corporate bond illiquidity mainly because both are accessible 
even in illiquid markets.4
The Japanese corporate bond market, which is the focus of our study, 
is an appropriate environment for the study on price implication of bond 
illiquidity. This is mainly due to thick and highly liquid government bond 
markets, the existence of which allows us to reasonably employ the yield 
difference between corporate and government bonds as a measure of risk 
premium. Fortunately, there was no major change in tax treatment asym- 
metrically affects the return from corporate and government bond invest- 
ments in Japan during our sample periods. In Friedman and Kuttner’s 
(1993) discussion about the spread of U.S. commercial papers and treasury 
bills, the illiquidity risk of government bonds and their institutional fea- 
ture (e.g., tax treatment) can potentially affect the spread. In describing 
the characteristics of Japanese corporate and government bond markets, 
we can largely ignore these issues and study the price implication of credit 
and illiquidity factors in a relatively clean way.
To illustrate the behavior of price dispersion, Figure 2(1) reflects the 
share of firms that remain under a certain level of GAP (e.g., equal to or 
smaller than 5, 10, 15, and 20 basis points) out of the total sample firms 
at a specific date. For example, the share of firms showing GAP that is 
smaller than 5 basis points is more than 80% in the second half of 2005. 
This was when the market environment was relatively good and the liqui- 
2 For U.S. stock and government bond markets, see information provided by 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). SIFMA publishes 
“The SIFMA Fact Book,” which is an annual data book on security markets.
3 In fact, the Japan Security Dealers Association (JSDA), from which we obtained 
our data, has almost no data for bid-ask spreads although their tables include 
columns for recording them. Some exceptions to this lack of proxy references exist. 
One is Chen et al. (2007), who used quoted bid-ask spreads as well as percentage 
zeros and the LOT measure proposed by Lesmond et al. (1999), in their study of 
corporate bond prices.
4 Another measure appropriate for illiquid markets is the latent liquidity measure 
proposed by Mahanti et al. (2008).
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Note: Each line corresponds to the proportion of firms having GAP smaller 
than various percentages (i.e., 0.05%, 0.1%, 0.15%, and 0.2%).
FIGURE 2(1)
DISTRIBUTION OF THE GAP MEASURE
dity was high. In contrast, shares were below 10% several periods after 
the Lehman shock. As discussed in the literature (e.g., Houweling et al. 
2005; Kaguraoka 2010), price dispersion can be generated by, for example, 
the difference in the prior of prices, the frictional trade environment, and/ 
or by the slow diffusion of information. In any case, the static measure 
constructed from cross-sectional information naturally contains valid in- 
formation about illiquidity.
As a concept, resiliency has been studied in the literature on market 
microstructure. Extant studies argue that illiquidity of corporate bonds 
may be inferred by checking whether or not reported quotes by market 
makers have persistency. If the market becomes highly illiquid and almost 
no transaction is carried out, a lesser portion of quotes depend on con- 
current information and thus, stronger persistency is displayed. These dis- 
cussions justify the usage of dynamic measure constructed from time- 
series information as a valid proxy for illiquidity.
While price dispersion and resiliency are certainly plausible as proxies 
for the illiquidity of corporate bonds, it is unclear whether or not they are 
mutually exclusive. In other words, the possibility of improving the preci- 
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Note: Bold solid lines show the three-year corporate bond spreads of two sample 
firms in our dataset. The dashed lines account for GAP of those two firms.
FIGURE 2(2)
INDIVIDUAL CORPORATE BOND SPREADS AND GAP MEASURES
sion of bond pricing by including multiple measures of illiquidity is still 
an open question. The purpose of our empirical analysis is to illustrate 
that the median level of reported spreads is correlated not only with 
standard covariates of bond spreads, but also with the dispersion of re- 
ported prices as well as with the level of past spreads. Through analysis, 
we aim to examine how static and dynamic measures of illiquidity comple- 
ment each other.
We also attempt to revisit the well-known view called “flight-to-quality” 
(e.g., Dick-Nielsen et al. 2012), which predicts that financial assets with 
low ratings rates can suffer more from the deterioration of liquidity. We 
are interested in finding to what extent our model with two illiquidity 
measures remain consistent with this view.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly details the related 
literature. Section 3 formulates the hypotheses to be tested in subse- 
quent sections. Section 4 illustrates our empirical framework. Sections 
5 and 6 respectively present the data and the interpretation of the 
results. Section 7 concludes and suggests future research questions.
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II. Related Literature
In asset pricing literature, two groups of studies are identified. The first 
group consists of works that perform classical empirical analysis for cor- 
porate bond spreads. The key implication shared among related literature 
is the insufficient ability of macro and/or micro credit factors to explain 
corporate bond spreads (e.g., Jarrow et al. 2000; Edwin et al. 2001; 
Huang and Huang 2003; Eom et al. 2004). Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) 
confirmed that credit risk factors cannot explain bond spreads even after 
incorporating various aggregate variables (i.e., S&P 500 returns, slope 
of government bond yields, and government yields) into the estimation. 
This empirical finding is also discussed in another literature as the Credit 
Spread Puzzle. Investigations by Hull et al. (2004, 2005) show that the 
default probability implied by the corporate bond yield in the secondary 
market is more than ten times the default rate calculated from historical 
data. They also identify the significant gap between corporate bond spread 
and the premium of Credit Default Swap (CDS). Our motivation in intro- 
ducing the viewpoint on liquidity premium, especially through simultan- 
eous employment of static and dynamic measures, is to partially resolve 
the inconsistency between classical model prediction and observed data.
The results of the first group of works naturally motivate the second 
group, which perform empirical analysis by incorporating an illiquidity 
factor. Most of these studies first choose an appropriate proxy which is 
supposed to capture market-level liquidity. To evaluate the performance 
of various proxies, majority of extant studies (e.g., Fleming 2003; Goldreich 
et al. 2005) in this direction use government bond yield, which is theore- 
tically unaffected by the credit factor. With the control of established 
market-level liquidity proxies, several papers then began to incorporate 
an additional individual liquidity factor. Amihud (2002), for example, 
pioneers the measurement of individual illiquidity by introducing the 
ILLIQ measure, which is computed as the average daily variation in stock 
return.5 Houweling et al. (2005) comprehensively examine how illiquidity 
factors work. Using European data, they apply a standard multi-factor 
model and separately establish the validity of several illiquidity measures. 
5 Precisely speaking, the ILLIQ measure is computed as the absolute price change 
divided by the trading volume of a given stock per day. Given that this ratio is 
actually a very noisy measure on any day, the average of all trading days in a 
month or in a year is derived to obtain a monthly or an annual liquidity estimate 
for the targeted stock.
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Kaguraoka (2010) employ a price dispersion measure called “yield discre- 
pancy” under a static panel estimation framework to measure the illiqui- 
dity of Japanese corporate bonds from 2002 to 2004. Our paper shares 
a very close motivation with the above-mentioned studies. The difference 
is that we use dynamic panel estimation techniques to explicitly incor- 
porate additional liquidity proxies (i.e., persistency) under a dynamic panel 
estimation framework. For the quantification of pricing implication of 
illiquidity risk for stocks, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) directly incor- 
porate the notion of “transaction cost” to a standard CAPM structure 
and explicitly evaluate illiquidity risk.6 Aside from the above papers based 
on a standard factor model specification, Bao et al. (2008) examine the 
price dynamics of corporate bonds and establish a proxy for corporate 
bond market liquidity. Our paper shares the belief that price dynamics 
(e.g., persistency) has information related to market liquidity.7
Among empirical studies on the correlation between corporate bond 
spreads and cross-sectional price dispersion, the latter ― which we use 
as a static measure for illiquidity ― is also theoretically motivated. A 
theoretical model closest to our motivation is that proposed by Tychon 
and Vannetelbosch (2005) who develop a corporate bond valuation model 
that has both credit and liquidity/marketability risks generated by a 
matching friction between bondholders and potential investors in a 
secondary market. Tychon and Vannetelbosch (2005) assume that each 
bondholder can be matched with a limited number of potential buyers 
in an illiquid market, which may not result in the match-up with posi- 
tive gain from the trade. Meanwhile, matching is guaranteed to always 
generate the positive gain in a liquid market.8 The main idea is that the 
liquidity premium originates from the interaction between (i) the differ- 
ence in matching frictions under illiquid and liquid market environments 
and (ii) the heterogeneity of investors’ valuations. To summarize, as the 
heterogeneity of belief becomes larger, bondholders/investors place lower 
6 Although our paper does not have an explicit asset pricing formulation, the 
model structure is actually an extension of the model first proposed by Fama and 
French (1993). Thus, to some extent, we follow a traditional factor model/CAPM 
structure.
7 Bao et al. (2008), referring to extant theoretical studies such as that of Roll 
(1984), hypothesize that the amount of price reversal or the negative of auto- 
covariance of prices is associated with the illiquidity of corporate bonds.
8 Therefore, matching in the liquid market is frequently to ensure that each 
bondholder can be matched with an investor who places higher evaluation for his 
bond. The authors assumed that the liquidity market always makes it possible to 
achieve profitable matching.
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relative values (i.e., higher spread) on bonds in the illiquid market than 
those in the liquid market as the heterogeneity of belief becomes larger. 
Bondholders and investors are less likely to find an appropriate coun- 
terpart for bond trading in the future when the matching friction is 
amplified by larger heterogeneity of bond evaluation.9 The recently de- 
veloped “differences of opinion” literature (Banerjee et al. 2009; Cao and 
Ou-Yang 2009; Banerjee and Kremer 2010) further pursues this direc- 
tion. Authors of these studies construct a theoretical model that incor- 
porates investors with heterogeneous beliefs about common public infor- 
mation and characterizes how such heterogeneous views are reflected in 
a market maker’s opinion, in market prices (average opinion), and in 
trading volumes through the learning process.10 From Houweling et al. 
(2005), we consider these discussions as theoretical underpinnings of 
our empirical study.
Studies on the Japanese corporate bond market are limited. First, 
Hongo and Oyama (2010) study the mechanism governing corporate bond 
spreads using a model without a liquidity factor. Second, Saito et al. 
(2001) examine the importance of a liquidity factor by featuring the liqui- 
dity demand described by Holmstrom and Tirole (2001). Shirasu and 
Yonezawa (2008) also challenge the same question using Japanese cor- 
porate bond market data. Third, Nakamura (2009) employ two methods 
to quantify the illiquidity risk on bond spreads. Differences include the 
incorporation of static and dynamic proxies for bond illiquidity and the 
estimation strategy.
III. Hypothesis Formulation
In this section, we mention several theoretical statements that motivate 
our empirical study. First, we review Tychon and Vannetelbosch (2005) 
who illustrate the connection between diverged price evaluation and cor- 
porate bond spreads. Second, we discuss the conditionality of the illiqui- 
dity premium on the firm-level risk. We also demonstrate a theoretical 
illustration of the relationship between resiliency and illiquidity, as well 
as its conditionality on firm-level credit risk. For all items, no attempt 
9 Consider an environment with no heterogeneous beliefs. Regardless of matching 
friction, no trade emerges and the heterogeneity among bondholders/investors does 
not matter.
10 Easley and O'Hara (2010) construct a model that generates equilibrium quotes 
and the non-existence of trading at the quotes, which can be observed during the 
financial crisis period.
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is made to provide an exhaustive survey or produce original theoretical 
models. We simply intend to establish a conceptual framework for ref- 
erence in the empirical section.
As a first step of our empirical study, we consider a static panel 
estimation framework that incorporates standard covariates and GAP. 
To illustrate the inclusion of GAP into our empirical study, we recall the 
model used by Tychon and Vannetelbosch (2005). As described in the 
previous section, the framework demonstrates a linkage between the 
opinion difference and the bond spreads. The liquidity premium in the 
model of Tychon and Vannetelbosch (2005) originates from the interaction 
between the less frequent trading in illiquid markets and the opinion 
difference among investors. The model clearly illustrates the emergence 
of the liquidity premium when the economy has heterogeneous beliefs. 
We use this perspective to construct our first hypothesis, which aims to 
confirm the validity of our static GAP measure. We also use empirical 
results based on the static model to evaluate the performance of the 
dynamic panel estimation.
Hypothesis 1: Median quoted spreads (i.e., three-year SPREAD), which 
we regard as representative market prices, are positively correlated with 
absolute dispersions of market makers’ quoted prices that are captured 
by the GAP measure in our setup, after controlling market and individual 
factors.
For (i) the market, we use the slope of Japanese government bond 
(JGB) yield curves as represented by the 10-year JGB yield minus the 
two-year JGB yield (JGBSLOPE ), the 10-year JGB yield (JGB10Y ), and 
the level of the Nikkei Average Stock Index (NKY); for (ii) the individual 
credit factors, we use the abnormal historical volatility of individual stocks 
and the credit ratings (eHV and RATE_RI );11 and for (iii) the market li- 
quidity factor, we use the three-month Tokyo inter-bank offered rate 
(Tibor) minus the three-month JGB yield, which represents the tight- 
ness of the money market (T_JGBGAP ).
The inclusion of JGBSLOPE, JGB10Y, and NKY is based on the dis- 
cussion made by Friedman and Kuttner (1993), who report that market- 
level credit risk factor affects the yield difference between various classes 
of security and government bonds. To check robustness, we also employ 
11 The unexpected historical volatility is estimated as the residual obtained from 
the regression of the individual historical volatility of stock prices on the historical 
volatility of the Nikkei average index.
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the spread of three-month commercial papers (i.e., CP) as an alternative 
proxy for market-level credit risk. This is computed as the difference 
between the average yield of commercial papers and the yield of JGB in 
the same maturity level (i.e., three-month: CP_JGB3M ). Considering high 
correlations with CP_JGB3M, we exclude T_JGBGAP in the robustness 
check. Note that CP_JGB3M is interpreted as the proxy for both market- 
level credit and liquidity factors, because it strongly reflects the tightness 
of the short-term money market.
To explicitly control the condition of foreign financial markets that may 
affect the attitudes of foreign investors, we employ the three-month dollar 
London inter-bank offered rate (DLIBOR ). As discussed in extant studies 
(e.g., Cook and Hahn 1989; Bernanke and Blinder 1992), market interest 
rates are largely affected by monetary policies. Thus, we also include 
the uncollateralized overnight call loan rate (ON_AVERAGE ) to our model, 
which is the target of Japanese monetary policy.12 We summarize the 
expected signs of each coefficient in the succeeding section.
For our second hypothesis, we consider the extant literature that em- 
phasizes on systematic conditionality on credit ratings of coefficients 
associated with liquidity factors for stock returns (e.g., Watanabe and 
Watanabe 2008). This also reflects the view called “flight-to-quality” 
(e.g., Dick-Nielsen et al. 2012). A key premise behind this view is that 
investors rush into safer assets when they perceive a larger risk. In 
other words, extant theoretical discussions presume that the liquidity 
premium interacts with the credit-risk factor. The liquidity spiral story 
discussed by Brunnermeier (2009) provides an illustrative example for 
this. In the liquidity spiral story, liquidity in financial markets can sud- 
denly evaporate due to the enhanced mechanism between two items. 
The first item is the easy conversion of assets into cash, while the second 
item represents the easy borrowing procedure for investors (see also 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009). When a severe shock hits financial 
markets, it results in high difficulty for investors with weak funding 
availability to borrow and/or to recover from their debts. Thus, they may 
be forced to instantly sell their assets. The selling of assets can inevit- 
ably place burden on their borrowing ability brought about by the value 
depreciation of their collateralized assets. In this case, assets with higher 
ratings can be sold immediately, which worsens liquidity of the remaining 
12 Considering the high correlation between these additional variables and the 
macro-factors employed in the baseline model, we exclude some of the variables 
when we incorporated DLIBOR and ON_AVERAGE.
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low-rated assets. This is the mechanism we theorize in this paper to 
formulate our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The GAP measure’s quantitative impact on bond spreads 
becomes larger (smaller) as credit ratings become worse (better).
This hypothesis can be tested by checking whether or not the coef- 
ficient associated with the GAP measure multiplied by the standard de- 
viation of the GAP measure is different among the samples that were 
split based on credit ratings.
Third, we add the dynamic resiliency factor to the static model. As 
intensively discussed in various empirical studies (e.g., BIS 1999), illi- 
quidity in the financial market is “multi-faceted.” However, extant empir- 
ical studies have mostly focused on a single index to measure and to 
price illiquidity. The main purpose of this paper is to improve the model 
fit by adding the dynamic resiliency factor, which is examined by testing 
the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: GAP and resiliency ( i.e., persistency on spreads) measures 
have statistically significant coefficients.
We also hypothesize that the conditionality considered in the second 
hypothesis is also applicable to the resiliency factor. We test this hypoth- 
esis by checking whether or not the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable varies with credit ratings.
Hypothesis 4: The quantitative impact of the resiliency term on bonds 
with spreads becomes larger (smaller) as credit ratings become worse 
(better).
IV. Empirical Framework
We discuss the empirical framework in this section. Unlike the typical 
time-series estimation based on sorted hypothetical portfolios employed 
in the extant literature, we use panel estimation with a balanced panel 
data of monthly Japanese corporate bond spreads, which are detailed 
in the next section. The benefits of employing panel estimation are 
twofold. First, it can fully extract both the time-series and the cross- 
sectional properties of our firm-level data. Thus, by applying the panel 
estimation framework to this dataset, we can precisely examine potential 
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determinants of individual corporate bond spreads. Second, our dynamic 
panel estimation enables us to establish empirical implications of our 
GAP measure as well as persistency in median quoted bond spreads.
Based on the literature on asset pricing, we start from a simplified 
version of a proposed multi-factor model, such as the model proposed 
by Fama and French (1993). 
SPit＝β1＋β2Ft＋β3Lt＋α i＋ε it                   (1)
Here, the dependent variable SPit denotes the spread of firm i at time t, 
which is computed as the difference between the three-year JGB yield 
and the linearly interpolated corporate bond yield.13 As an explanatory 
variable, Ft denotes various market credit indexes at time t (i.e., stock 
market index, information related to the government bond yield curve, 
the spread of commercial paper, variable related to monetary policy, and 
variable related to foreign financial markets). In addition to these aggre- 
gate credit factors, we incorporate the market liquidity factor Lt repre- 
sented by Tibor minus JGB spread, which indicates the tightness of 
short-term financial markets. As mentioned in the previous section, we 
use the average of commercial paper spreads as another proxy for market 
liquidity and for market credit index. We attempt to confirm that each 
coefficient has an expected sign implied by extant theoretical studies. 
According to standard panel estimations, α i captures the firm-specific 
individual effect, which acquires either a fixed value (fixed-effect model) 
or an independent random variable (random-effect model) for each group 
with a zero mean and with the standard deviation σ α. ε it denotes the 
error term that is allowed to have some correlation within the same i by 
using the cluster-robust standard error.
Subsequently, we advance to the extended version of the model by 
incorporating fit, which denotes the individual firm-specific credit risk 
factor of firm i at time t. We use credit ratings and historical abnormal 
volatility of stock returns as proxies for fit. Credit ratings are defined as 
discrete numbers from 2 to 11. The larger number corresponding to a 
worse credit rating, which is reported by the Rating and Investment 
Information, Inc (R&I).14 Historical abnormal volatility of stock returns 
13 In the next section, we will describe in detail the process of computing this 
number.
14 If firms in our sample do not have their credit ratings from R&I but from 
other rating agencies, we transform these into hypothetical R&I ratings (e.g., 
AAA＝1，AA＋＝2, and so on). This transformation is done by referring to the 
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is computed as the regressing residual of the estimation of the 20-day 
historical volatility of individual stock prices on that of NKY.15
SPit＝β1＋β2Ft＋β3Lt＋β4 fit＋α i＋ε it                  (2)
The model below adds the individual liquidity proxy lit to the extended 
multi-factor model above.
SPit＝β1＋β2Ft＋β3Lt＋β4 fit＋β5 lit＋α i＋ε it               (3)
The additional factor lit is represented by GAP, which denotes the highest 
minus the lowest reported spreads among market makers at time t.16 
Note that we observe that most corporate bonds, including those issued 
by high credit utility companies (e.g., companies who generate electricity), 
maintain a significant GAP in our sample period (see Figure 2(2)).17 Our 
concern is whether, and if so how, model (3) is better than models (1) 
and (2), and whether or not the signs of estimated coefficients are quali- 
tatively consistent with our predictions. The estimation is implemented 
by fixed-effect and random-effect estimations.
From a technical point of view, we may need to control the level of re- 
ported spreads to incorporate appropriately the GAP variable. One method 
is by simply including the level of the highest or the lowest quoted 
spread and the GAP itself. Another method is to construct the so-called 
“relative distance measure,” similar with Houweling et al. (2005), which 
is calculated by GAP divided by an appropriate-level variable (e.g., con- 
current JGB yield). We employ the second method in a later section as 
a checking procedure for robustness of our results. 
Finally, model (4) is used to implement dynamic panel estimation. 
Specifically, the lagged dependent variable SPit－1 is incorporated. As 
mentioned in the previous section, this formulation is motivated by the 
notion of resiliency. Supposedly, the coefficient γ assumes a value close 
to one, which implies that the median reported spread is persistent, if 
the market exhibits low resiliency. We then become interested in how 
model (4) is better than model (3).
companies holding both R&I ratings and ratings provided by other agencies.
15 The estimated historical volatility is obtained by regressing individual historical 
volatility on that of the Nikkei stock average index (i.e., NKY).
16 We use one-day lagged GAP to avoid a simultaneity bias.
17 In Japan, electricity, gas, and other utility companies have maintained high 
ratings due to institutional reasons. 
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SPit＝γ SPit－1＋β1＋β2Ft＋β3Lt＋β4 fit＋β5 lit＋α i＋ε it           (4)
As Arellano (2003) carefully demonstrates, dynamic models with lagged 
dependent variables are suitable for the estimation of economic variables 
with adjustment costs and/or habit formation. In the current context, 
persistency represents the dependency of the bond evaluation of market 
makers on the spreads reported in the previous period due to insufficient 
information obtained from transactions. Estimation for this dynamic model 
is implemented through fixed-effect estimation, random-effect Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS) estimation, and random-effect Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE).18
A few points need to be discussed for model selection. First, we prefer 
MLE than that with other specifications. With the existence of individ- 
ual effect (either fixed or random), OLS obviously cannot provide a con- 
sistent estimator. Moreover, fixed-effect and random-effect estimations with 
a lagged dependent variable also cannot provide a consistent estimator.19 
Although an Arellano-Bond GMM estimator that considers this problem 
is widely used for dynamic models, recent studies emphasize that the 
over-identification restriction test does not work on long time-series data. 
For example, based on the full instrument set, the Sargan-test is essen- 
tially never satisfied when T (and hence the number of moment condi- 
tions) becomes too large for a given value of N (Bowsher 2002). Since 
our sample contains a relatively large T (i.e., 82), while N is just 52, 
GMM cannot be used.20 In order to apply MLE where we can ignore the 
issue of correlation between residuals and lagged dependent variables 
to our dynamic model, we need to determine in advance the distribution 
for the initial dependent variable (i.e., SPi0). Fortunately, the large T of 
our sample alleviates this problem; thus, we can almost ignore the initial 
observation problem.21
18 Although the results are not shown in this paper, we mention the employ- 
ment of the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation (see Arellano and Bond 1991). The 
results are very close to those obtained by a random-effect MLE, unless otherwise 
noted.
19 Nonetheless, we show the results of fixed and random effects in model (4) 
for comparison with other estimations.
20 Blundell and Bond (1998) also point out that the instruments used in 
standard first-difference GMM estimators are less informative in two important 
cases: when the value of γ increases toward unity and when the relative variance 
of fixed effect increases. We observe that the long T problem is prominent in our 
analysis.
21 The key idea is that the effect coming from the initial observation for the 
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Second, in relation to the first point, the bias of the estimator associ- 
ated with the random effect is shown to be smaller as the time-invariant 
standard deviation σ α also becomes smaller. Hsiao (2003) concisely shows 
the following expression for the estimated AR(1) coefficient:
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
( )ˆ
N T N T
i t it it i t i it it
N T N T
i t it i t it
SP SP SP
SP SP
α εγ γ= = − = = −
= = − = = −
Σ Σ Σ Σ += = +
Σ Σ Σ Σ            
(5)
where





1 1 1cov( , ) [( 1) ]
1 1
N T














−= + − − +
− −
∑ ∑
The last term at the right-hand side of the second expression becomes 
smaller as σ α becomes smaller. We use this property to evaluate our 
estimation results in a later section.
V. Data
We obtained data from the Japan Securities Dealers Association (JSDA), 
which has reference data on Japanese corporate bond markets. The 
data on daily frequency consist of the highest, the lowest, mean, and 
median bond yields of all companies reported by selected market makers 
(i.e., “member security firms”), after excluding outliers based on pre- 
determined rules.22 These member security firms report the yield of each 
company’s existing bonds at different maturity levels by 4:30 pm every 
estimation of model parameters through MLE becomes almost negligible as the 
length of data becomes longer (Hsiao 1986). Meanwhile, the validity of assuming 
normal distribution remains the same.
22 The selected market makers are as follows: SMBC Friend, Okasan, Credit 
Swiss, Cosmo, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Shinsei, JP Morgan, Daiwa SMBC, 
Deutsch, Tokai Tokyo, Nomura, BNP Paribas, Marusan, Mizuo, Mizuho Investors, 
Mitsubishi UFJ, Merrill Lynch Japan, Morgan Stanley, and UBS. If the number 
of reporting security firms is 15 to 20, the three security firms with the highest 
yields and the three security firms with the lowest yields are excluded. The cri- 
terion for exclusion is as follows: among 10 to 14 security firm reports, we deter- 
mine two firms with highest yields and two firms with lowest yields; in addition, 
among 5 to 9 security firm reports, we exclude the highest and the lowest.
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Note: Each dot corresponds to the reported yields from JSDA data. The three-year 
yield data used for computing the spread are obtained by interpolating those 
points linearly.
FIGURE 3(1)
INTERPOLATED YIELD CURVE FOR FIRM-A (JULY 31, 2003)
business day and then determine the price of 500 million yen worth of 
bonds as of 3:00 pm on the same day. JSDA collects the data and re- 
leases four reference data mentioned above on their website by 5:30 pm 
every business day.23
We only consider the data of listed firms that maintain a certain number 
of issued bonds, enabling us to calculate the spread for the three-year 
tenor. Note that most existing works incorporate maturity level as an 
explanatory variable without adjusting yields by maturity. From the 
standard practical viewpoint, assuming a linear relationship between 
spread and maturity is too restrictive. We usually observe a non-linear 
yield curve in reality. For a given company, we draw its yield curve and 
calculate its three-year yield by linear interpolation. We apply this pro- 
cedure to construct the yield corresponding to the highest, the lowest, 
mean, and median reported values. Figures 3(1) and 3(2) exhibit the 
23 If the gap between the highest and the lowest yields is more than 500 bp, 
the data are not released.
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Note: Each dot corresponds to the reported yields from JSDA data. The three-year 
yield data used for computing the spread are obtained by interpolating 
those points linearly.
FIGURE 3(2)
INTERPOLATED YIELD CURVE FOR FIRM-B (JULY 31, 2003)
resulting median yield curves for two firms in our sample, respectively. 
Our targeted spreads corresponding to three-year maturity levels are then 
extracted from the median yield curve and from the concurrent JGB 
yields.24 With this operation, we do not need to control maturity levels 
as explanatory variables. With the shape of the time-series data con- 
structed and shown in Figure 4, we believe this interpolation does not 
generate any critical problems.
From the data, we use the median spread as our dependent variable. 
This is computed as the difference between the linearly interpolated me- 
dian of the three-year corporate bond yield and that of the three-year 
Japanese government yield. We use the difference between the highest 
24 Estimation results based on five-year spreads are provided upon request. 
Constructing 10-year spreads is apparently difficult due to the insufficient amount 
of long-term corporate bond data. Meanwhile, we do not have one-year spreads 
in our analysis simply because bonds that are very close to maturity tend to ex- 
hibit irregular dynamics.
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Note: SPREADHP3 and SPREADLP3 refer to the spreads corresponding to highest 
price (hence lowest spread) and lowest price (hence highest spread), re- 
spectively. SPREADAP3 and SPREADMP3 refer to the average and median 
reported spreads, respectively. These data are computed from the inter- 
polated yield curve and the concurrent JGB yield.
FIGURE 4
INTERPOLATED SPREADS (HIGHEST, LOWEST, AVERAGE, MEDIAN)
and the lowest yields (GAP) as one of two illiquidity factors. The median 
is more ideal than the mean because it is not directly affected by the 
highest and lowest spreads. Considering that the data are significantly 
persistent, we also use data with monthly frequency. Table 1 shows the 
summarized statistics of our explanatory variables and their definitions, 
while Table 2 summarizes the correlation.25
For the market-level liquidity proxy (T_JGBGAP ) and the individual 
credit factors (eHV and RATE_RI ), we expect a positive correlation with 
the median reported spread. For the macro factors and for the monetary 
policy-related variables (i.e., JGBSLOPE, JGB10Y, ON_AVERAGE, and 
DLIBOR3M ), existing literature provides mixed implications. For example, 
the steeper slope of the government yield curve can be interpreted as a 
precursor of better economic environment as well as a risk in elevating 
future interest rates (e.g., Fama and French 1993). Similarly, the lower 
uncollateralized overnight call loan rate can be a proxy of liquid short- 
25 As a reference for the estimation based on the sample splits, the summarized 
statistics and the correlation tables are provided upon request.
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term financial markets as well as a result of lower policy rate corres- 
ponding to a poor economic environment. Thus, we prefer to treat these 
variables as control variables without initially assigning specific expected 
signs. For the rest of the macro factors (i.e., NKY and CP_JGB3M ), we 
expect negative and positive correlations with a median reported spread, 
respectively. The adjusted GAP measure obtained by dividing the spreads 
by concurrent JGB yields is used for the robustness check of our esti- 
mation results. This represents the micro liquidity factor with an expected 
positive coefficient.
From almost 120 firms in our original sample, the number of groups 
(i.e., firms) is reduced to 52 because of the maturity level control ex- 
plained above. However, our sample still contains a large variation in 
credit ratings and in the GAP measure. The sample period is 82 months, 
spanning July 2003 to April 2010.26 Although the original data cover a 
longer time period, we focus on the period when the GAP measure is 
available.
VI. Estimation Results
In this section, we implement the estimations proposed in the previous 
section. All results from the static panel estimations are summarized in 
Table 3. With the target variable (i.e., GAP) defined in a firm level, we 
allow the correlation of observations within the same group i (i.e., firm). 
As a standard treatment in panel studies, we use the firm-level cluster- 
robust standard error to evaluate estimated coefficients.
First, the models without the GAP measure, which are introduced in 
(1) and (2), are estimated by the random-effect model with the cluster- 
robust standard error.27 Then, the models with the GAP measure, which 
are introduced in (3), are estimated by the fixed-effect model, the random- 
effect model, and MLE.28 After the standard model specification tests, 
we confirm that the fixed-effect model is more suitable than pooling 
OLS (see F-test results in Table 3) and that the random-effect model is 
more suitable than the pooling OLS model (see results of the Breusch 
26 Due to the limitation of data availability of CP_JGB3M, the sample period is 
shortened from July 2003-April 2010 to July 2003-October 2009 when we in- 
corporate CP_JGB3M in our model.
27 Estimation results based on the fixed-effect are very close to the numbers 
in Table 3.
28 For the test of model specification, the fixed-effect and random-effect models 
are estimated without the use of the cluster-robust standard errors.
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TABLE 4
DYNAMIC MODEL
























































































_cons 0.1117 0.0311 *** 0.0710 0.0344 ** 0.0690 0.0232 ***
R-sq:  # Obs
       # Group
       within
       between




















Breusch and Pagan 










rho: AR(1) on 
e=0.0125
(Std.=0.0055)
Note: ***:1%,**:5%,*:10%. Model (4) is estimated by a fixed-effect model (FE), 
a random-effect model (RE), and random-effect MLE (AH MLE). Models (4) 
(other than AH MLE) is estimated with cluster-robust (firm-level) standard 
errors. The model specification tests are implemented by the models 
without the cluster-robust standard error. Models fitted on these data 
fail to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausmann test.
and Pagan test in Table 3). We cannot, however, determine which model 
is better since the models fitted to our data fail to meet asymptotic as- 
sumptions of the Hausman test. With the estimated results of the fixed- 
effect and the random-effect models as reasonably similar, we use both 
as our main models. In these two models, results of sensitivity analysis 
of each coefficient with respect to credit ratings are further demonstrated 
in Table 5.
The estimated coefficients in our static panel estimations are as follows. 
First, higher Tibor-JGB spreads (T_JGBGAP ), which represent tightness 
in the money market, contribute to a higher median spread. This is con- 
sistent with our prediction that the spreads are positively correlated with 
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the market-level liquidity index. Second, steeper JGB slope (JGBSLOPE) 
is correlated with lower corporate bond spreads in models (1) and (2).29 
This implies that a steeper slope can be interpreted as the precursor of 
a better future market condition. Third, the higher yield of JGB (JGB10Y) 
with controlling the slope has positive impact on the corporate bond 
yield. This result has several interpretations. One perception is that the 
higher yield of government bonds is a sign of worse market conditions 
for corporate bonds. For example, a higher interest rate may negatively 
affect firms with large borrowing. In order to see how the market-level 
credit factor more explicitly affects the corporate bond spread, we sub- 
sequently use the spreads of commercial paper as an alternative factor. 
Fourth, the higher level of stock price index (NKY ) is correlated with 
lower corporate bond spreads in models (1) and (2).30 This result is con- 
sistent with the view that lower market-level credit risk substituted by 
the higher stock price is associated with low corporate bond spreads. Fifth, 
the abnormal individual stock price volatility (eHV ) has a positive effect 
on corporate bond spreads. Similarly, the credit ratings of each company, 
as provided by R&I (RATE_RI ) that covers the largest number of Japanese 
companies, have the same implication as eHV. 
As the most important result, we establish a strong positive correlation 
between GAP and median spreads. We also find that the influence of 
GAP depends negatively on the credit ratings (i.e., as credit ratings worsen, 
GAP coefficients multiplied by the standard deviation of GAP become 
larger).31 Consequently, the impact is 0.09 (coefficient 1.2941 × standard 
error 0.07) in the fixed-effect estimation. Meanwhile, the credit rating at 
the beginning of the sample period is greater than or equal to 4 (i.e., AA-) 
or is approximately double at 0.18 (coefficient 1.4695 × standard error 
0.12).32
Although we successfully improved the model by adding the GAP meas- 
ure in the static panel estimation, the residual plot of the random-effect 
model in Figure 5 shows obvious heteroskedasticity. The first feature of 
29 Although results from model (3) do not support this, we can confirm this in 
the results from the dynamic model presented in the succeeding section.
30 Although the results from model (3) do not support this, we can confirm this 
in the results in many cases to be mentioned later.
31 As we have explained above, we transform each rating into numbers. Detailed 
computation results are provided upon request.
32 We obtain a similar implication from the estimation of the random-effect 
model. Detailed summary statistics for each sub-sample are provided upon re- 
quest.
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Note: Fitted three-year spreads are plotted on the horizontal axis while the resi- 
dual is on the vertical axis. The upper ( lower) panel is the result of fixed- 
effect ( random-effect) estimation. TIME refers to 82 monthly periods, from 
July 2003 to April 2010.
FIGURE 5(1)
RESIDUAL PLOT OF STATIC PANEL ESTIMATION (RANDOM-EFFECT)
the residual plot is the lower part of the scatter plot (i.e., the spreads of 
firms with good credit and/or those in a good market environment period), 
which forms the down-sloped concentration. The second feature (i.e., the 
spreads of firms with weak credit or those in a bad environment period) 
is in the upper scattered portion. With some potentially omitted variables 
that capture the behavior of the second feature, the static model gener- 
ates a number of very large positive residuals in the higher spread range. 
These outliers attract the regression line upward and render the over- 
estimation of the first feature.
Under the presumption that the lagged dependent variable is one plaus- 
ible omitted variable, the dynamic models proposed in (4) are estimated 
by fixed-effect and random-effect GLS and MLE.33 The results summar- 
33 We also estimate Arellano-Bond GMM, and the results are very close to those 
from MLE, unless otherwise noted.
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Note: The horizontal axis corresponds to TIME, while the residual is plotted on 
the vertical axis. The upper (lower) panel is the result of fixed-effect (random- 
effect) static panel estimation. TIME refers to 82 monthly periods, from 
July 2003 to April 2010.
FIGURE 5(2)
RESIDUAL PLOT OF STATIC PANEL ESTIMATION (RANDOM-EFFECT)
ized in Table 4 show that all estimation methods result in almost the 
same coefficients. Upon the examination of the scattered plots (Figure  
6) corresponding to MLE estimations, the emerging problem from the 
omitted variables seems to be resolved satisfactorily. We can also confirm 
that the dynamic panel still provides qualitatively similar results, such 
as the coefficient of GAP, compared with those in the static model. The 
estimate of the AR(1) coefficient ranges from 0.86 to 0.89, which indicates 
a very strong auto-correlation. Hence, the conjectured persistency of the 
reported bond spreads is successfully confirmed through our dynamic 
panel estimation. Moreover, the results show that simultaneous inclusions 
of static and dynamic measures significantly improve the model fit.
Another important point is that the AR(1) coefficient also has apparent 
conditionality on credit ratings and/or the business cycle. Table 5 sum- 
marizes the spectrum of the AR(1) coefficient for different levels of credit 
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Note: Fitted three-year spreads are plotted on the horizontal axis while the re- 
sidual is on the vertical axis. The panel shows the results based on MLE.
FIGURE 6(1)
RESIDUAL PLOT OF DYNAMIC PANEL ESTIMATION (MLE)
ratings. The purpose of this additional analysis is to compare AR(1) coef- 
ficients with respect to credit risk.34 The negative conditionality of AR(1) 
coefficients on credit ratings is clear. The persistency of the median 
spread becomes stronger as credit ratings worsen, as established by 
Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012).
Furthermore, σ α in MLE for the dynamic model is substantially smaller 
than that for the static model. This is consistent with the fact that 
estimated coefficients are similar among various estimation methods. If 
the individual characteristics are properly controlled, it is natural to 
have very small variations in the estimators of individual effects.
In order to check the robustness of the result, Table 6 reports the re- 
vised regression results in (3) and (4) under an adjusted GAP measure 
constructed by dividing GAP by the concurrent JGB yield. The results 
34 Recall that, in order to split the sample, we use (i) whether the credit rating 
at the beginning of the sample period is better than or equal to 4 (i.e., AA-), or 
(ii) worse than or equal to 5 (A+).
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Note: The horizontal axis corresponds to TIME while the residual is plotted on 
the vertical axis. The panel shows the results based on MLE. TIME refers 
to 82 monthly periods, from July 2003 to April 2010.
FIGURE 6(2)
RESIDUAL PLOT OF DYNAMIC PANEL ESTIMATION (MLE)
obtained in previous estimations are confirmed in this additional estima- 
tion.
Table 7 reveals the results of the static random-effect estimation and 
of the dynamic MLE with the split GAP measures, which consist of (i) 
the difference between the highest minus the median spreads and (ii) 
the difference between the median and the lowest spreads. The purpose 
of this exercise is to observe the evolution of reported spread distribu- 
tions in correlation with the median spreads. As the table shows, both 
upward [i.e., ( i) mentioned above] and downward [i.e., (ii) mentioned 
above] divergences have positive coefficients. This implies that the opinion 
difference in either direction has specific information correlated with the 
median evaluation. 
As indicated by additional robustness checks, we replace some market- 
risk factors (i.e., T_JGBGAP, JGBSLOPE, and JGB10Y ) with the average 
commercial paper spread (CP_JGB3M ).35 As revealed in the first three 
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_cons -0.7013 0.2901 ** -0.6050 0.1883 *** 0.0766 0.0246 ***
R-sq:  # Obs
       # Group
       within
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rho: AR(1) on 
e=0.0085
(Std.=0.0048)
Note: ***:1%,**:5%,*:10%. Models (3) (FE and RE) is estimated with cluster-robust 
(firm-level) standard errors.
columns of Table 8, we confirm that CP_JGB3M works consistently as a 
market-risk factor, while GAP and the persistency measure are robust 
against this alternative variable choice.36 The results also imply that 
the lower short-term rate (ON_AVERAGE) is correlated with wider cor- 
porate bond spreads. This reflects the employment of monetary easing 
policy in the case of higher macro credit risk. Corporate bond spreads 
also become wider when a larger risk is perceived in the foreign financial 
market (i.e., higher DLIBOR3M ).37 Although foreign investors are not ne- 
35 Due to high correlation among variables, we are not including some of the 
variables in our baseline estimation.
36 We can infer that our result associated with GAP and the persistency term 
is not suffering from the potential omitted variable bias since various alterations 
of explanatory variables do not affect results.









































































































_cons -0.4794 0.2317 ** -0.4261 0.1449 *** 0.0606 0.2324 ***
R-sq:  # Obs
       # Group
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(SPLIT GAP: HI-MEDIAN SPREAD AND LOW-MEDIAN SPREAD)
Note: ***:1%,**:5%,*:10%. All the models (3) are estimated by either a fixed-effect 
model (FE) or a random-effect model (RE) with cluster-robust (firm-level) 
standard errors. Models (4) is estimated by random-effect MLE (AH MLE). 
Models (3) is estimated with cluster-robust standard error (firm-level). GAP3_ 
1DLAG_UP and GAP3_1DLAG_DOWN denote the differences between (i) the 
highest reported spread minus median reported spread and (ii) the median 
reported spread minus the lowest reported spread, respectively. Both variables 
are one-day lagged.
cessarily major players in Japanese corporate bond markets, this finding 
implies the potential connection between the condition of foreign financial 
markets and that of the Japanese corporate bond spreads.38
37 Due to the high correlation between NKY and DLIBOR3M, we exclude NKY 
when we incorporate DLIBOR3M in our estimation.
38 According to the Bank of Japan, the outstanding amount of corporate 
bonds held by foreign investors is only 2.1 trillion yen out of 76.7 trillion yen of 
the total outstanding amount as of the end of September 2011.
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Finally, we consider the unobservable time-effect η t by including either 
monthly or annual time dummies into our model in our baseline estima- 
tion, as shown in (6). The last two columns in Table 8 display the model 
that has monthly or yearly frequency time-dummy variables, based on 
the model by Baltagi (2008). All results associated with GAP and the 
persistency term remain same. This further confirms the robustness of 
our empirical results.
VII. Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the price impact of corporate bond illiquidity. We 
employ the dynamic panel estimation to simultaneously examine the static 
price dispersion measured by GAP and the dynamic resiliency factor sub- 
stituted by the lagged dependent variable. Unlike extant studies that treat 
these as separate objects, we study both price dispersion and resiliency 
in a unified framework and observe that the inclusion of both measures 
significantly improves the model fit. Their price impacts are also con- 
firmed to systematically respond to credit ratings of bonds. These results 
imply that the incorporation of multiple measures of illiquidity improves 
the precision of corporate bond pricing.
To conclude, we list several future research questions. First, our esti- 
mated results can be used to motivate theoretical models. A model with 
a market maker that continuously revises its evaluation about bond 
spreads while still exhibiting heterogeneous valuations can be created.39 
This behavior stems, for example, from heterogeneous funding availabi- 
lities of clients under limited arbitrage opportunity. Second, the study 
on the determination of GAP can serve as informative research objects. 
Developing well-functioning corporate bond markets has been one of the 
most important policy issues, for example, in Asian financial markets 
(Kang 2007). We believe the results obtained in this paper and those 
from the extension proposed above provide further understanding of cor- 
porate bond pricing, which can certainly contribute to the development 
of corporate bond markets.
(Received 5 December 2011; Revised 13 February 2012; Accepted 6 April 
2012)
39 Feldhütter (2012) partly considers this environment.
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